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ABSTRACT

This paper takes as the focus of its examination a
particular form of racial conflict.
That conflict can be
seen as one of interpretation.
The working premise is that
racial or ethnic heritage influences the interpretation of
language and events; the meaning that we find in any
"text" — written, spoken, or lived — is not the inherent
content of that text but rather an interpretation, a
reading, that is affected by the racial perspective from
which we observe the text.
To explore this point, the paper
borrows from recent studies in interpretative theory
developed in literary and social criticism.
This form of racial conflict is examined in a
particular context: the predominantly white, racially
integrated American university.
This paper examines
paradigmatic incidents of racial tension in which a
conscious, malicious intent is not the source the problem.
Rather, this paper argues the problem arises from
conflicting interpretations of an action or event, and that
interpretations conflict because they originate from
significantly different racial experiences.
Finally, this paper examines the social power structure
of predominantly white universities to explain how students
of minority racial groups, whose interpretations of events
do not underlie institutional structures, are harmed by
racial conflict.
It offers some tentative proposals for
revising institutional life to alleviate this harm.
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RACISM AND RACE RELATIONS IN THE UNIVERSITY

1

INTRODUCTION
"White students say, ’[the university] is great; it's
awesome'. . . . But I just want to get my education and get
out of here.
This is their place, not mine."
— black student at a major state
university, interviewed in wake of
incidents of racial harassment and
violence on campus1
"It bothers us that we have to defend ourselves against
racism when we know we are not racist."
— white student at a major state
university, responding to
complaints that his fraternity's
poster was racially offensive2

American universities in recent years have endured a
resurgence in racial tensions on their campuses, and the
problem has manifested itself often in startlingly blatant
racist incidents.

At the same time, people of color

continue to experience a racism that takes more subtle and
elusive forms than in earlier eras, a racism that no longer
manifests itself simply in the appearance of "white only"
signs, and the utterance of epithets such as "n-gger."

It

is a racism that is a persistent and constituent part of the
1 Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Racism's Nuances, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
2 Cavalier Daily (University of Virginia student
newspaper), Oct. 4, 1988, at 1.
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social order, woven into the fabric of society and everyday
life.

Professor Lawrence has suggested that this aspect of

racism is "in large part a product of the unconscious" that
is "arises from the assumptions we have learned to make
about the world, ourselves,

and others as well as from the

patterns of our fundamental social activities."3

It is a

racism frequently less intentional, and very often— to white
people— less obvious.

But its victims insist that it is no

less real, harmful, or in need of remedy.4
Confrontation of such racism has led to debate over the
very definition of racism.

Consideration of the issue,

however, has also engendered a significant "backlash,"
premised on the assertion that all the racism that needs to
be eradicated has been; that we have gone too far in
recognizing, and still pay too much attention to, a
phenomenon that is no longer a problem.

The argument is

even extended to contend that the continuing remedial
efforts themselves have become the problem, as has the
overuse of the label "racism."5
3 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 33 0
(1987) .
4 See Wilkerson, supra note 1, § 1, at 34, col. 4 (survey
of students at the University of Maryland revealed two-thirds of
white students were unaware of racial incidents on their campus,
but 80% of black students knew of such incidents).
5 See M. Omi & H. Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States 1-6 (1986); id. at 109-35 (focusing attention on three
main "currents" of reactionary and conservative tendencies in the
1980's that share the "similar ambition" of "discredit[ing] the
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The conflict over racism's form and existence
implicates the entrenched American belief in equality of
opportunity.

The degree to which we believe in the

existence of equality of opportunity informs

key ideas and objectives of the 1960fs minority movements"); id.
at 71, 134 (noting recent definition of "reverse discrimination,"
and observing that the biggest reversals have taken place in
affirmative action policies such that now it "is the liberals who
are guilty of racism"); Trescott, Is Social Racism Now Becoming
'Acceptable?', L.A. Times, June 12, 1981, § V, at 2, col. 1
(observing that "the veiled insult, contempt masquerading as a
joke, [and] the direct slur . . . [are being] recycled as a
protest against minority gains") Kennedy, Persuasion and
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1327, 1344 (1986) (observing that the "Reagan
Administration's policies reflect, reinforce, and capitalize on
widespread feelings that blacks have received an undeserved
amount of the nation's attention"); Kluegel, If There Isn't a
Problem, You Don't Need a Solution: The Bases of Contemporary
Affirmative Action Attitudes, 28 Am. Behav. Scientist 761, 770
(1985) (proposing that "whites will continue to believe that
because they themselves are not prejudiced (in the traditional
sense) and because racial prejudice seems to be diminishing in
general, there is no longer a problem"); Abram, Affirmative
Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1312
(1986) (arguing that the civil rights movement "should turn its
attention back to first principles— the zealous regard for equal
opportunity and the promotion of color-blind law and social
policy— and away from color-conscious remedies that abandon
principle and lead us further from a society free of the bane of
racial discrimination").
One scholar asserts that some of the new subtle racism on
campuses "may be due to 'whites hearing all year they are
racists,'" while another argues that the "word 'racism' itself
has become loaded . . . and is often used irresponsibly."
School
Colors: Uneasy Gray Between Black and White, Christian Sci.
Monitor, June 14, 1988, at 16-17 [hereinafter School Colors]; cf.
Detlefsen, White Like Me: Racism 101 at Harvard, The New
Republic, Apr. 10, 1989, at 18, 21 (criticizing a series of
seminars on institutional racism at Harvard University and noting
that "to the extent that the charge of 'racism' is repeatedly and
gratuitously tossed about . . . there is a danger that the evil
of genuine racism will become trivialized and hence will be
ignored").
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antidiscrimination law and the assessment of racism*s
persistence, because truly equal opportunity would mean many
social and economic disparities between racial groups are
the result of something other than racism.

If one assumes

the existence of a functioning meritocracy,

achievement and

social condition are direct results of individual effort and
ability.

But if one sees the "thoroughly political— which

is to say contestable— nature of *merit,*" then race becomes
an appropriate and unavoidable consideration in that
calculus.6
The dynamics of the problem of addressing racism and
mediating race relations recur in universities across the
country when students and faculty deal with racially tinged
incidents, but an incident confronted by several University
of Virginia law students serves as a paradigm.

When

students of color came together to complain to the
administration about seemingly offensive remarks made in
class by a professor, most white students in the class, as
well as the professor himself, could find nothing offensive
in the challenged remarks.

Yet, black students

(and some

students of other races) were overwhelmingly offended.
Their options for recourse in the institution were few.
6 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 13 3 3; see Crenshaw, Race,
Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1380 (1988);
Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1163,
1199 (1988) (asserting that "[m]erit is a social construct that
reflects a range of characteristics over which the individual has
no control").
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Although the students were granted a few private meetings
with the administration and an eventual brief apology,
faced the indignant denials
elsewhere)

they

(in the student newspaper and

by many white students and the professor that

anything offensive ever occurred, as well as angry
chastisement for inaccurately alleging such injurious
charges.7
To most white students in that debate, racism was
defined as an act of intentional maliciousness;
professor intended no racial offense

if the

(or at most,

if the

offense wasn't so obvious to white people that the professor
should have noticed it), then none occurred.

Black

students, by contrast, had a completely different idea in
mind: They sought to express their deep dissatisfaction with
"the substantive dynamics of the classroom.1,8
7 See Prof's Alleged Remarks Prompt Petition, Va. L. Weekly
(University of Virginia School of Law student newspaper), Apr.
15, 1988, at 1; Va. L. Weekly, Apr. 22, 1988, at 2, col. 1
(student letter to editor expressing doubt that allegations of
professor's discriminatory remarks were true, because student
"never heard any discriminatory remarks from the man in his class
last term"); id. at 3 (professor's open letter addressing
specific allegations of racist and sexist remarks, commenting on
each "incident" because professor felt he had "engaged in no
conduct for which I need feel ashamed or apologetic"); id. at 5,
col. 1 (letter from student observing that "many students (not
just the minority students who receive affirmative action) are
voicing concerns about the offensive statements"); id. at 1-2, 56 (letters declaring public petition initiated by several student
organizations protesting professor's remarks to be "invidious,”
"reckless," and offensive to "basic notions of fairness and due
process").
8 Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 11 N a t '1 Black L.J. 1, 2 (1988-89).
As Crenshaw
notes, "[i]n many instances, minority students' values, beliefs,

6
One of the problems underlying such debates over racism
is epistemological: How do we know '•racism”— what events,
statements, behavior, and social conditions will "count" as
racist?

The definition of racism is a policy choice.

The

question of how we interpret— and whom we let interpret—
social events and behavior in order to identify racism is
the underlying struggle in the construction of our
understanding of race.9
A related problem is the racial distribution of power
in carrying on such debates, and in institutional life
generally.

The power to define racism, and more generally

to determine what issues will be discussed in terms of race,
is prerequisite to the power to shape institutional life.
Thus,

if universities will not acknowledge race as a

relevant issue in any incidents except blatantly intentional
and experiences clash not only with those of their classmates but
also with those of their professors."
Id. at 2.
9 See M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 57-66.
The
authors observe that "race has been a matter of political
contention," id. at 57, "a pre-eminently sociohistorical concept.
Racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete
expression by the specific social relations and historical
context in which they are embedded."
Id. at 60.
Further, the
"seemingly obvious, 'natural' and 'common sense' qualities which
the existing racial order exhibits themselves testify to the
effectiveness of the racial formation process in constructing
racial meanings and racial identities."
Id. at 62.
For a related argument on the struggle to define
"desegregation," cf. Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of
Meaning, in Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School
Desegregation 31 (D. Bell ed. 1980) [hereinafter Shades of Brown]
(proposing that the changing meaning of terms such as
"desegregation" is "merely the surface of larger issues" such as
the question of what place blacks should have in American
society).

ones,

issues such as the substantive dynamics of classrooms

for students of color will be ignored, and the discomfort
black students experience in many white-dominated classrooms
will be denied.
As racist incidents and tensions have increased on
college campuses in recent years, university
administrations,

state governments, and student and civil

rights groups have searched for ways to combat racism in the
university,

as well as to improve campus racial climates.

Ad-hoc student groups frequently have formed on individual
campuses to combat racist incidents.

A network of many such

groups from colleges in the Northeast met at Yale University
in the spring of 1988 to form the organization Campuses
Against Racial Violence and establish a databank on racial
incidents.

State government and university administration

officials gathered for two conference on racial and ethnic
relations in higher education.

At the same time, there is a

seeming lack cf recognition among some higher education
officials that racist incidents occur on their campuses,
even as reports of such incidents recur in the popular
p r e s s .10u
10 See Grasso, Racism on Campuses Discussed at Conference,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, § 23 (Connecticut Weekly), at 6, col.
5. Among government agencies and private groups that have
gathered data and studied the issue of racism on campus are the
National Institute against Prejudice and Violence, the Southern
Regional Education Board, and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.
The New Jersey Department of Higher Education surveyed State
Higher Education Executive Officials (SHEEO's) in every state
about racial incidents occurring on their college campuses.
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This thesis aims to provide a description of racial
dynamics on college campuses that will illuminate why
institutional responses are needed to address racism,

in its

elusive and controversial forms as well as its blatant ones.
First, the goal is to document that racism on campus is real
and substantial enough to require a remedy.

Second,

it is

to argue that while sanctions against racist actions and
speech, crafted within the parameters of current
antidiscrimination law, can be helpful, a more fundamental
restructuring of the institutional arrangements on
integrated campuses may be the only way to ease racial
tensions on such campuses.

Underlying this thesis' analysis

is the assertion that the problem of combating racism on
campus is not simply a question of correcting individual
racist attitudes or punishing racist behavior versus
protecting free expression; it is also a question of whose
expression will be empowered by institutional structures,
and whether all racial groups will be allotted equal
institutional power within universities.
Sixteen states reported no racial incidents in the last three
years, and another 11 did not respond to that question on the
survey.
Yet, incidents of violence or allegations of racial
prejudice, occurring in the spring of 1988 alone, were reported
in the popular press in 10 of those 27 states.
See Marcus,
State-Level Efforts to Improve Racial/Ethnic Harmony on Campus 19
tables 1 & 2 (1989) (unpublished paper available from the Office
of Institutional Affairs, New Jersey Department of Higher
Education).
Marcus concludes from the survey that SHEEOs exhibit a
tendency to underreport the incidence of racial tension, and that
"it is clear that the number of incidents cited by the SHEEOs in
the survey does not approach their actual level."
Id. at 19-20.

9
To that end, this thesis works from the realization
that injury results not only from intentional racism, but
also from conceptual, aversive, or unconscious racism and
from the inevitable clash of perspectives among racial
groups.

Part I of this thesis briefly summarizes a

sociology of knowledge,

in order to introduce the

perspective that the thesis utilizes on how we come to know
and use abstract concepts such as racism in our
interpretation of social events.

Part II examines how a

history of racism pervades understandings of social life
because it has pervaded the lived experience of social life;
this Part examines how our history of racism affects the
things that we perceive as racism.

Part III places such

arguments in the context of the university setting,
presenting a description of the contemporary academy that
indicates the extent and effect of racism there and
emphasizing the need for additional remedies.

Part IV

surveys remedial possibilities for universities as they
formulate policies for addressing the problem of racism in
the university setting.
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I.

RACISM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Even in the wake of anti-objectivist critiques, there
persists throughout the sciences, humanities, and law a
faith in the objective meaning of language and social
events.

Despite modernism's undermining of the faith in

authoritative values and foundations that would allow us a
constant framework within which to understand social life
across time and context, people have difficulty
relinquishing the Platonic belief that they can get to the
true, real essence of things if they only look hard enough.
One epistemological assumption of that belief is that the
meaning of words and texts exists prior to their
interpretation by individuals, that such words and texts
have inherent content that is discerned rather than created.
Truth,

in other words,

is out there to be discovered, and

knowledge is "looked upon as the instrument by which to take
possession of the Absolute."11
11 Hegel: The Essential Writings 44 (F. Weiss ed. 1974).
Traditional epistemology, which is the study of the nature
of knowledge, entails "belief in the existence of transcendent,
objective truth," Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 429, 430 (1987).
Professor Williams adopts Wittgenstein's
label of the "picture theory" to refer to the traditional
Platonic, objectivist view that language provides a picture of
reality.
Id. at 433-34 & n.21.
According to this view, "human
understanding is reached when language captures the 'glassy
essence,' the [Platonic] Form, of a particular object.
For
example, the word 'tree' links an actual tree with the essence of
what it means to be a Tree."
Id. at 434 (footnotes omitted).
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Likewise, meaning in social life is experienced as
fixed, objective,

or "really there" because our language,

texts, and modes of behavior are "reified."

Our language

and social practice construct and institutionalize what we
think of as "obvious," "common sense," and "natural."12
When this way of thinking is applied to the problem of
The picture theory, then, "can be seen as a search for
foundations.
The core Platonic impulse was . . . the need for
human knowledge, perceptions, and values to achieve the kind of
absolute certainty characteristic (so it was believed) of
mathematical truth in general, and of Euclidean geometry in
particular."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12

[R]eification is the apprehension of the products of
human activity as if they were something else than
human products— such as facts of nature, results of
cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will . . . .
The reified world . . . is experienced by man as a
strange facticity, an o p u s alienum over which he has n o
control rather than as the o p u s proprium of his own
productive activity.

P. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality 82-83
(1966); cf. M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 57-66 (arguing
that many racial theories seek "to remove the concept of race
from fundamental social, political, or economic determination,"
and suggest instead "that the truth of race lies in the terrain
of innate characteristics").
See Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term— Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 11-15 (1987).
Professor Minow
observes that each year the Supreme Court and the nation itself
confront dilemmas of difference in a heterogeneous society that
arise out of "powerful unstated assumptions about whose point of
view matters," assumptions that "work in part through the very
structure of our language, which embeds the unstated points of
comparison inside categories that bury their perspective and
wrongly imply a natural fit with the world."
Id. at 13.
She
argues that "[l]egal treatment of difference thus tends to treat
as unproblematic the point of view from which difference is seen,
assigned, or ignored, rather than acknowledging that the problem
of difference can be described and understood from multiple
points of view."
Id. at 14.
In this regard, "[e]xisting
institutions and language already carve the world and already
express and recreate attitudes about what counts as a difference,
and who or what is the relevant point of comparison."
Id. at 15.

12
racism, people start from the assumption that a phrase or
event either is or is not racist, because racism either is
or is not the inherent, positive content of the phrase.
Disputes about meaning can degenerate into something like,
"you say a remark is racist, but I know it is really not.
If you understood its meaning correctly, you would
agree.1,13
Once one abandons traditional epistemology, the
question of which social forces most influence the
institutionalization of language and social experience
13

Professor Fish explains the broader problem:
[S]hared understanding is the basis of the confidence
with which [people] speak and reason, but its
categories are their own only in the sense that as
actors within an institution they automatically fall
heir to the institution's way of making sense, its
systems of intelligibility.
That is why it is so hard
for someone whose very being is defined by his position
within an institution . . . to explain to someone
outside it a practice or a meaning that seems to him to
require no explanation, because he regards it as
natural.
Such a person, when pressed, is likely to
say, "but that's just the way it's done" . . . .

Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, reprinted in H. Adams & L.
Searle, Critical Theory Since 1965, at 525, 532 (1986).
Berger and Luckmann note that there are certain "social
circumstances that favor dereification," that is, that make it
easier for one within an institution to see the contingent
construction of the social order instead of seeing it only as
"the way it's done."
Such circumstances include "the overall
collapse of institutional orders, the contact between previously
segregated societies, and the important phenomenon of social
marginality." P. Berger & T. Luckmann, supra note 12, at 85
(footnote omitted). The last two circumstances are particularly
relevant for understanding American racism, because whites and
blacks have had vastly different experiences under racist
practices and ideologies.
Whites in particular have little
knowledge of how b l a c k s ' understanding of the social world is
affected by that experience.

13
becomes crucial; it leads to the examination of the
relationship between knowledge and power.
community agreement— e.g.,
the remark is not racist,

Reliance on

"since so many people agree that
it must not be"— begs the question

of the community’s composition.14
The communities that impose the prevailing
understanding and interpretation of racism, particularly in
the university, are clearly skewed in their membership.
Major universities are dominated in their administrations,
faculties, and student bodies by whites— and
disproportionately those born into the comfortable classes.
One purpose of this thesis is to show that the way
universities as institutions understand racism is affected
by the composition of their membership, that such an effect
underlies the institutional perpetuation or toleration of
racism,

and that such an effect is unavoidable because

understandings of race vary according to the historical
experience and current social position of racial groups.
If we acknowledge the divisions within a community,
then consensus over what that community constructs as its
shared assumptions becomes problematic.

It is likely to be

a consensus among only parts— the most powerful parts— of

14 Berger and Luckmann reason that "[i]f the integration of
an institutional order can be understood only in terms of the
’knowledge' that its members have of it, it follows that the
analysis of such 'knowledge1 will be essential for an analysis of
the institutional order in question."
P. Berger & T. Luckmann,
supra note 12, at 61.

14
the community.

In such a case, the presuppositions that

serve as the unacknowledged starting points for
interpretation are exercises of social power by the groups
able to put them in place.

With particular attention

focused upon the university setting, this thesis suggests
that on the issue of race, we must examine the history of
"racial formation" and the ideologies growing out of it, in
order to understand how differing racial identities and
histories affect the interpretive understanding of— and
remedial efforts to address— the problem of contemporary
racism.15

15 See M. Omi and H. Winant, supra note 5, passim.
Removing the implication of conspiracy, presuppositions that form
the prevailing parameters around the issue of racism begin to
look like Gramsci's notion of ideological hegemony.
See
generally J. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony,
Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process 23-60 (1981)
(discussing Gramsci's doctrine of ideological ascendancy or
"hegemony," essentially grounded in the idea that the dominant
class must establish its own moral, political, and cultural
values as the conventional norms of practical behavior).
The hermeneutic strategy of study proposed here presupposes
the inability to discover the "deep structure" of "what's really
going on"; this is a necessary concession to abandoning truth as
positive content.
Rather, the strategy is a never-ending
interpretive effort to get within a community (or text) and
understand it on its own terms, as well as assess it from various
points outside the system.
The strategy borrows from the process
of the "hermeneutic circle," see, e.g., R. Bernstein, Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis 13139 (1983), but departs from versions of that process that claim
to result in a final, determinant understanding.
The same project
could be done with forms of racism other
than American black-white relations, and for gender
discrimination.
See,
e.g., Rhode, supra note 6, at 1191 (noting
that the "same biases
. . .that disadvantage women also operate
against minorities")? Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education of
Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988) (analyzing why many
women find law school alienating).

15

II.
A.

RACISM AS AN INFLUENCE ON INTERPRETATION

Historical Origins
Racism so pervades our social history and cultural

experience that it has fundamentally shaped our collective
unconscious, with the result that "a large part of the
behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced
by unconscious racial motivation.11

As Professor Lawrence

has suggested, racism can be understood as an "illness
[that] affects almost everyone," but it might help to think
of racism in a less aberrational sense as well.

One's race

gives one, almost unnoticeably, a perspective on racial
issues different from people of other races.

Such

unconscious racial perspectives affect our definition and
recognition of racism.16
The disparity in perceptions between blacks and whites
on issues of race continues to result in blacks and whites
assessing incidents— even well-known public events— in
radically different terms.

Judge Higginbotham,

for

16 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 321-22; see also Brooks,
Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel Process: Toward
an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 J. L. and Inequality 1, 811 (1987).
Professor Brooks argues that whites generally think
of racism as intentional belief in white supremacy, but that
because "the state of mind of one who perpetuates minority
subordination makes little difference to those who suffer from
minority subordination— i.e., minorities— racism is defined by
minorities to include minority subordination."
Id. at 9.

16
instance, has contrasted the "predominantly white
perspective" on the Declaration of Independence as "the
greatest achievement in the history of man" with Frederick
Douglass*

famous remarks on that document:

This Fourth of July is yours. not mine.
You may
rejoice, I must mourn.
To drag a man in fetters to the
grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him
to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and
sacrilegious irony. . . .
I am not included within the
pale of this glorious anniversary . . . .17
The history of racism helps to develop, and in turn is
perpetuated by, a shared psychology and culture of which
racially affected ideology is a constituent part.

One

blatant aspect is a persistent set of images, myths, and
stereotypes that historically constituted white and black
racial identities:

industrious/lazy,

intelligent/unintelligent, moral/immoral, enabling
culture/disabling culture, law-abiding/criminal,
responsible/shiftless, virtuous/lascivious.
and Howard Winant have explained,

As Michael Omi

"[r]acial beliefs operate

as an 'amateur biology,* a way of explaining the variations
in 'human nature.1"

Our society tends "to view race as

something fixed and immutable— something rooted in 'nature.1
Thus we mask the historical construction of racial
categories, the shifting meaning of race."18
17

A. Higginbotham,

In the Matter of Color 5 (1978).

18 M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 62-64 (footnote
omitted). The list is taken largely from Crenshaw, supra note 6,
at 1373.
A more complete development of these traditional race
characterizations appears in J. Kovel, White Racism: A

17
The traditional formulation of racial identities serves
to perpetuate what Professor Crenshaw terms a "white race
consciousness" that "legitimates prevailing injustices and
constrains the development of new solutions that benefit
Black Americans."

Crenshaw traces the transformation of

this consciousness into the unconscious "white norm" that is
taken as a neutral standard even after the demise of
explicit white supremacy ideology.19
White race consciousness, experienced as neutral and
practiced without malicious intent, defines whites'
interpretation of racism and social life.

Black Americans'

understanding of race is similarly defined by historical

Psychohistory 51-92 (1970).
For a related discussion of the development of ideologies of
racial identities, see M. Omi & H. Winant, supra note 5, at 5769.
For an explanation of the human tendency to create
irrational categories of racial and ethnic characteristics, see
G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 17-27 (1954).
This landmark
study also provides excellent analyses and theoretical
explanations from a psychological perspective of the preferential
thinking, creation and perception of group differences, as well
as sociocultural factors that are part of the complex process of
forming prejudices.
19

Crenshaw,

supra note 6, at 1369.

She elaborates:

The white norm . . . has only been submerged in popular
consciousness.
It continues in an unspoken form as a
statement of the positive social norm, legitimating the
continuing domination of those who do not meet it.
Nor
have the negative stereotypes associated with Blacks
been eradicated.
The rationalizations once used to
legitimate Black subordination based on a belief in
racial inferiority have now been reemployed to
legitimate the domination of Blacks through reference
to an assumed cultural inferiority.
Id. at 1379.

18
experience? neither is neutral.

Yet, one conception will be

inevitably privileged in that it will be utilized as the
basis for understanding and acting against racism, as well
as serving as the basis for understanding written texts,
legal doctrine, and social life generally.
Professor Wasserstrom provides an example of the way
such "conceptual racism operated in Brown v. Board of
Education.

He argues that, logistically, most school

districts could have been integrated within a few days of
the C o u r t ’s decision.

Most counties had two high schools,

one white and one black, and ” [t]here was nothing difficult
about deciding that— as of the day after the decision— half
of the children . . . who lived in the southern part of the
county . . . would go to [one high school] and all those who
lived in the northern half would go to [the other]."

Yet

the Court justified its order of desegregation "with all
deliberate speed," by citing "problems related to
administration, arising from the physical condition of the
school plant, the school transportation system, personnel,
revision of school districts . . . and revision of local
laws."20
Wasserstrom's point is that administrative problems
many places)

(in

could be easily handled, and building

conditions were only a problem because the Court could not
20 See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential
Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 581, 599601 (1977); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

envision ordering white children to attend school in the
same substandard facilities black students had endured.

The

Supreme Court allowed an infamously slow remedial process
because of an unacknowledged conclusion that white students
could not be made to attend inferior black schools.

Until

all schools could be upgraded, black students would have to
(continue to) endure inferior facilities.

Because black

lives were implicitly valued less than white ones, the Court
ignored the more obviously just intermediate remedy:
ordering white students, who had long had the benefit of
better facilities,

to use the inferior ones while black

students, who had unconstitutionally been relegated to the
poor schools for generations, gain the temporary benefit of
better facilities.

Yet to the Court, leaving students in

current facilities until all schools were improved seemed
neutral.21

B.
Implications of Interpretation Through Race
Consciousness
Our society has established a national consensus
against blatant,

intentional racism, and in the decades

21
An obvious factor— no doubt considered by the Court—
complicates Wasserstrom's thesis.
Immediate integration simply
would not have been carried out by local officials, and it might
not have been enforced by the executive branch.
Also, such a
decision certainly would have ignited violent resistance from
some whites.
The Court was at the limits of its institutional
powers.
While this point may undermine Wasserstrom's assertion
about the ease of immediate integration, it does not affect his
insight that black children's experience was valued less than
white children's.

20
since Brown v. Board of Education has developed a sizable
set of legal remedies to address it.

Even when remedial

mechanisms do not reach such racism— as, for instance, when
black people cannot win tort actions for intentional racial
slurs— we at least have the conceptual apparatus to
recognize that racism exists.22
We have no such recognition, however,

for more subtle

racism— the unconscious, usually unintentional racial bias
that infects the taken-for-granted concepts, categories, and
assumptions with which we make sense of the world.

Law and

much of our social discourse recognize racism only in the
form of an overt expression of white racial superiority and
deliberate efforts to denigrate, segregate, or deny
opportunity on the basis of skin color.

The law and popular

understanding have incorporated into the idea of racism
neither contemporary descriptions of the psychology of
unconscious racism nor recent theoretical thinking that has
displaced traditional epistemology with a debate over
hermeneutic approaches.

Neither have they acknowledged the

importance of racial identity— of one's membership in a
distinct racial group rather than a colorblind "humankind"—
in the interpretation of racism.

The result is racism—

aversive, conceptual, and unconscious— that cannot yet be

22 On tort actions for racial slurs, see Delgado, Words
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and NameCalling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982).
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acknowledged, and thus not remedied.23
Yet while it is not acknowledged,
even by whites.

it is often felt,

Many blacks inevitably feel an anxiety in

predominantly white institutions even though the
institutions are now integrated and formally neutral in
matters of race.

Some whites feel a collective guilt for

the sins of the their ancestors, and for the dimly
recognized possibility that their own social status is due
partly to the historical subordination of blacks.
Alternatively,

some whites resent the expectation of guilt

and feel no responsibility for racial tensions they did not
intentionally cause.

This mixture of emotions and attitudes

can be the cause of awkward situations in which race issues
arise in integrated groups, not only because an arguably
offensive remark has been made, but because the tremendous
disparity in the social histories of blacks and whites make
efforts at empathy and understanding difficult, particularly
for whites.24
23 Kovel defines the aversive racist as 11[t]he type who
believes in white race superiority and is more or less aware of
it, but does nothing overt about it. An intrapsychic battle goes
on between these sentiments and a conscience which seeks to
repudiate them.” J. Kovel, supra note 18, at 54-55.
On
conceptual racism, see Wasserstrom, supra note 20.
On
unconscious racism, see Lawrence, supra note 3; Lawrence,
"Justice” or "Just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 Stan.
L. Rev. 831 (1983).
24 For a description of such an incident and a development
of this argument, see Steele, I'm Black, You're White, Who's
Innocent? Race and Power in an Era of Blame, Harper's Mag., June
1988, at 45; Steele, The Recoloring of Campus Life, Harper's
Mag., Feb. 1989, at 47, 53-55 [hereinafter Steele, Recoloring].
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Antidiscrimination law, and particularly equal
protection doctrine,

is formulated explicitly to address

only intentional racism.

Professor Freeman,

in an

influential article, has called this approach the
"perpetrator perspective.”

As he describes it:

[R]acial discrimination [is seen] as something that is
caused by individuals, or individual institutions,
producing discrete results that can be identified as
discrimination and thereafter neutralized. . . . The
perpetrator perspective . . . presupposes that apart
from the misguided conduct of particular actors the
rest of our society is working . . . .
All we need do
is root out the villains.
Having done so, we can say
with confidence that it was all their fault.25
The landmark equal protection decision of Washington v.
Davis is exemplary in this respect.

In Davis. the Court

ruled that state action is not unconstitutional "solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”

Rather,

discrimination "must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose."

In other words, the perpetrator's

intent, and not the victim's injury,

is the law's concern.

If an identical racial harm were caused unintentionally, the
equal protection clause would offer no remedy.

The

principle was quickly extended by the Court to other equal
protection claims.26
25 Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contra
diction, Rationalization, in Shades of Brown, supra note 9, at
71, 74-75.
26 Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
For
cases in which the Davis principle was extended, see, e .g.,
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (segregation
of schools must be shown to be the intent of the school board);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
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Such a conception of racism might be adequate if
perpetrators always made manifest a racist intent.

But not

only does such a theory privilege the perpetrator *s
experience of racism over the victim's,

it also does not

begin to aid in recognizing more subtle, aversive racism.
The perpetrator perspective sheds no light on a situation in
which a black person feels the injury of a racist remark or
action, yet the white "perpetrator" intends or recognizes no
racism.

Concomitantly,

the law's perpetrator perspective

conceptualizes racism as a discrete and specific act, an act
committed by one individual,

group, or institution against

another whose injury can be identified.

It ignores the

possibility that "race" is structural and interstitial, that
it can be the root of injury even when not traceable to a
specific intention or action.27
429 U.S. 252
motivated).

(1977)

(housing segregation must be racially

27 See Brooks, supra note 16, at 9-10 (noting that "whether
the harm is backed by a racial animus does not change its
existence or ameliorate the pain suffered by its victims," that
"when individuals and institutions having 'good' intentions
engage in a pattern or practice of granting low priority to
matters of keen importance to minorities— such as real access to
quality jobs, education, and housing— that is subordination and,
hence, racism, as far as minorities are concerned" (footnote
omitted)).
Cf.. Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A
Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 Signs: J. Women in
Culture & Society 421, 439 (1987) (concluding that "[t]hough
antidiscrimination law may have produced positive social change,
legal strategies put unacceptable burdens on disadvantaged groups
with little promise of success"); Rhode, supra note 6, at 1193
(observing that although "they have been effective against the
most overt forms of gender discrimination, traditional equal
opportunity frameworks have not confronted the deeper
institutional and ideological forces that contribute to gender

24
A large body of sociological research on law has found
overwhelming evidence that legal institutions discriminate
against blacks in ways that cannot be explained on the facts
of the cases or through legal doctrine.

It is well known,

for instance, that death penalty sentences are given more
often to black defendants than to whites, and more often to
the killers of white victims than to those of black victims.
That racial disparity holds up across the handling of lesser
crimes as well.
data.

Intentional prejudice cannot explain that

But the realization that race affects thought and

experience in things seemingly unrelated to race (such as
whether a particular act constitutes an ,faggravating
circumstance" sufficient to justify the death penalty over
life imprisonment)

sheds light on such disproportionate

results.28
Such racism requires attention,

for it is a

disadvantage").
28 See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in
Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 Crime and Delinquency 563
(1980).
Even under revised death penalty statutes approved by
the United States Supreme Court, "race of both offender and
victim ha[ve] a tremendous impact on the chances that death
sentence would be handed down."
Id. at 596-97.
The
discrepancies "have been extreme in magnitude, similar across
states and under different statutory forms, pervasive over
successive stages of the judicial process, and uncorrected by
appellate review."
Id. at 629.
The death penalty is given most
often in cases in which a black has killed a white, next most
often when a white has killed a white, then when a black has
killed a black, and least often when a white has killed a black.
See D. Black, Sociological Justice 61 (1989).
For data on lesser
crimes, see D. Black, The Behavior of Law 17, 21-22, 24-25
(1976) .
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manifestation and perpetuation of a race consciousness that
results in real injury.

White race consciousness informs

and helps constitute the existing social conditions that
whites are able to reconcile with processes of formal
equality and the belief that racism is no longer a
significant problem in the United States.
Outside the law, the absence of a recognition of race
consciousness, which is in part an understanding of racism
limited to the perpetrator perspective, helps to explain
vocal resentment of whites to charges of racism and provides
insight into allegations that the term "racism" has been so
misused and overused that it has lost its meaning.

When

whites conceive of "racism" as requiring an intentional
racist motive for which they deserve personal blame for a
personal fault, they get angry because they know they had no
racist intent.

They plead that they were misunderstood,

that blacks are "oversensitive."
complained,

or

As one white MIT student

'[h]alf my buddies on the [high school] football

team were black, and I come here and read every other day in
the paper that I'm a racist.

It irritates me."29

This misunderstanding of the nature of racism is the
basis of a problematic confrontation in black-white
relations:

a nonmalicious remark or action by a white person

to which black people take offense or feel injury.
speaker's reaction,
29

School Colors,

in turn,

A white

is either uncomprehending

supra note 5, at 17.
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puzzlement

("How could that possibly be seen as racist?")

or

some mixture of vocal denial and backlash ("I didn't mean
any harm, and it angers me that you accuse me of it").

The

dilemma hinges on differing interpretations of the cultural
or symbolic value of social events.
Consider the debate over the Confederate flag.

Black

students at schools where white fans wave the flag and sing
"Dixie" during football games see the Confederate emblems as
symbols of an era in which their ancestors were enslaved by
whites.

Many white students, on the other hand, seem to

take the flag as representative merely of their Southern
heritage,

a cultural identity distinct from Northern or

urban lifestyles.
endorsing,

Such whites do not see themselves as

through the flag, a return to slavery.

They

simply do not see what the big deal is about celebrating the
Confederate flag once one concedes that violent racial
subjugation is a bad thing.

As defined by their intentions,

many whites do not view their use of the Confederate flag as
problematic.

Nor is it made so by the banner's frequent

appearance at Ku Klux Klan rallies —

or its use by white

students at the Citadel as an act of defiance in the wake of
a racial incident on campus.30
30 See, e.g., Aitken, Racism on Campus: Beyond the Citadel,
People Mag., Dec. 15, 1986, at 58, 65-66 (recounting a Citadel
football game where "brand-new rebel flags were waved defiantly
by white students and alumni" three weeks after white students
there dressed in white sheets had burned a cross in the room a
black student; one alumnus observed that the action was
tantamount to chanting "n-gger, n-gger"); The Stars and Bars Is

27
The problem is that white students interpret through
the only lens of understanding they have available: a set of
assumptions and metaphors, arising from a specific
sociohistorical context, which constrains what
interpretations will seem "obvious."

Such constraints are

contingent and could be ameliorated with a broad-based
commitment that began with the recognition that such
attitudes are racially based even when not racially
motivated.

Not A Racist Symbol, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1988, at A17, col. 1
(justifying display of the flag).
Black groups have made efforts in recent years to have the
Confederate flag removed from Southern state houses and other
public buildings.
See, e . g . , Confederate Flag in Norfolk Draws
Protests, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1988, at B 2 , col. 6 (reporting on
an attempt to remove the flag from Norfolk City Council
chambers); Hill, Symbol of Dixieland Has Blacks Seeing Red, Wash.
Post, Jan. 15, 1988, at A3, col. 1; Eubanks, Ole Miss Is Still
Torn 25 Years After Meredith, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1987, at Dl,
col. 4, D 2 , col. 4 (Confederate flag for black students at Ole
Miss "represented Mississippi's racist past" while for the writer
it was a "harmless symbol of a bygone era").
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III.
A.

RACISM IN THE UNIVERSITY

The Evidence and Experience of Racism
Educational institutions have been a primary context in

which the judicial system has grappled with the problem of
remedies for the historical subordination of black people.
In many respects universities have equaled or surpassed
other institutions in efforts to remedy the effects of past
racism in a variety of ways,

including affirmative action

policies, minority scholarship programs, Afro-American and
other non-European courses of study in the curriculum, and
minority cultural centers on campuses.

Nevertheless,

universities exhibit the shortcomings of remedial efforts.
Some universities have not met court orders for enrollment
of minority students.

Many do not have minority student

bodies equivalent to the minority population of their
states, and figures for minority faculty lag even further
behind.

Resistance to calls for curriculum revision

persist.31
Race is peculiarly problematic in the context of higher
education.

In its most limited definition, to which many

31 Landmark antidiscrimination cases that arose educational
institutions include Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955); Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
On universities' efforts at integration, see Vobejda,
School Integration: 4 States Pass, 6 Fail, Wash. Post, Feb. 11,
1988, at A3, col. 1.
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whites still subscribe, racism is an attitude held mostly by
the unenlightened or uneducated, that is, an isolated
position peculiar to the culture of Afrikaaners,

some

Southern state officials, or some working class white
ethnics in the outer boroughs of New York.
definition,

Given that

it is difficult to admit the presence of racism

among society*s most sophisticated and intellectually
gifted.

And indeed, despite persistent problems, many

blacks find college campuses better than many other whitedominated social spaces.

Still, many black students

experience campus life as a disturbing or even hostile
atmosphere that at a minimum distracts attention and energy
from academic pursuits.32
The university is also a singularly powerful
institution in the distribution of wealth.
products,

Its primary

credentials in the form of college degrees, are

limited and valuable commodities.

Most students, especially

32 Steele, Recoloring, supra note 24, at 47-48.
Steele
recalls:
When I went to college in the mid-Sixties, colleges
were oases of calm and understanding in a racially
tense society; campus life— with its traditions of
tolerance and fairness, its very distance from the
"real*1 world— imposed a degree of broadmindedness on
even the most provincial students.
If I met whites who
were not anxious to be friends with blacks, most were
at least vaguely friendly to the cause of our freedom.
In any case, there was no guerilla activity against our
presence, no "mine field of racism'* (as one black
student at Berkeley recently put it) to negotiate.
I
wouldn't say that the phrase "campus racism" is a
contradiction in terms, but until recently it certainly
seemed an incongruence."
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those ambitious enough to compete for admission to topranked schools, are aware of this fact.

Those who go to

college make more money, on average, than those who do not;
those who graduate from elite institutions usually make more
than those who earn diplomas from second- and third-tier
schools.

White students who believe that admissions

criteria based on grades, test scores, and the status of
one's high school are objective,

fair and neutral indicia

for college admissions resent scarce (and valuable)

seats

being filled by minority students admitted through
affirmative action policies

(though there is little

opposition to affirmative action for athletes and children
of alumni.)

Both faith in the meritocratic processes that

are supposed to govern the university's intellectual task
and the self-interest that intensifies competition for the
university's key commodity mesh with a particular racial
ideology to contribute to questioning by whites of the
legitimacy of black students' presence in academia.

White

acceptance of the ideology of equal opportunity and
unproblematic meritocracy helps eliminate the need to see
racism as a key factor in an economy and social structure
that distributes rewards with tremendous disparity.33
33 See Wrong Message from Academe, Time, Apr. 6, 1987, at
57 [hereinafter Academe] (statement of Adele Terrell, program
director of the National Institute Against Prejudice and
Violence) (contending that students "'are competing for
scholarships and grants that are drying up'. . . with a resulting
reaction by whites against perceived rivals"); Mangan, At Texas:
An Undercurrent of Hostility Amid Efforts to Promote
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In addition, the current divisions in the understanding
of racism on university campuses serve as an accurate
paradigm for race issues in the larger, national context.
Today*s white students missed most of the civil rights
movement and legally enforced segregation.

Many feel no

direct responsibility for institutionalized racism and
believe that with formal legal barriers to integration now
dismantled, students of color stand on an equal footing with
them.

As Professor Fleming observed:
Most [students] would like to ignore the subject [of
racism], just like most of society.
That attitude is
at the source of the racial incidents.
The average
student doesn't feel responsible for the racial climate
or civil rights.
They don't feel responsible for
anything that they don't have direct knowledge of.
They have been taught systematically to ignore race as
a subject.34

As with most white people generally, white students'
conception of racism is constructed from the images that the
civil rights movement confronted: enforced segregation,
Multiculturalism, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 26, 1989, at A29,
col. 1 (statement of Michael L. Davis, director of Minority
Information Center, University of Texas-Austin) (noting that
"[t]here is an undercurrent of antagonism, maybe even
frustration, with programs and moneys specifically set aside for
minorities, especially when money is tight"); Crenshaw, supra
note 6, at 1380 (footnote omitted).
Professor Kennedy notes that many beneficiaries of
affirmative action recognize that "merit" is "a malleable
concept, determined not by immanent, preexisting standards but
rather by the perceived needs of society," and rightly insist
that "considering a black's race as part of the bundle of traits
that constitute 'merit' is entirely appropriate."
Kennedy, supra
note 5, at 1333.
34 Quoted in Magner, Blacks and Whites on the Campuses:
Behind Ugly Racist Incidents, Student Isolation and
Insensitivity, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 26, 1989, at Al, A29.
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physical violence, blatant hateful epithets, and an overt
denial of racial equality.
With such barriers now either gone or greatly
diminished, many whites tend to think that racism has
largely disappeared,

at least in any form that could serve

as an impediment to opportunity and achievement.

White

students have a very hard time understanding how their
predominantly white campuses can seem hostile to people of
color; how their campus social life is a distinctly "white
culture," even when the major institutions within it are not
explicitly labeled the "white student union," "white student
newspaper," or "white debating club."

It does not occur to

most white students that their indifference or hostility to
the Martin Luther King national holiday,

for example,

is

evidence of attitudes on racial issues that differ
tremendously from their black colleagues.

It does not occur

to most white students that the major, campus-sponsored
concerts of white music groups constitute distinctly white
cultural events.35
A white University of Texas student voiced an attitude
not uncommon among whites when he complained,

"I don't like

a black-student center any more than I would like a white-

35 Cf. B. Blauner, Black Lives, White Lives: Three Decades
of Race Relations in America 3 (1989) (observing that although an
"extremely significant achievement," the national celebration of
Dr. King's birthday "makes it easier to avoid facing squarely the
evils of racism, economic injustice, and war that he struggled
against").
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student center."

The hostility,

or at least puzzlement,

one

hears among many white students toward distinctly black
cultural centers, student groups, and social events arises
from white students'

lack of recognition that the

overwhelmingly white campuses themselves are in some sense
large white cultural centers— ones in which black students
are likely to have difficulty feeling at home.

Thus, white

students' assertions that they only want all people treated
the same, without the separatism of institutions such as
black cultural centers, are often experienced by minority
students as demands that they assimilate into whitedominated institutions and culture.

That white norm extends

even into the classroom.36
The reports of racist incidents on college campuses
recur continually in the popular press.

The National

Institute Against Prejudice and Violence collected reports
of seventy-eight incidents of racial violence or allegations
of prejudice that occurred in the spring semester of 1988
alone, and that did not purport to be a comprehensive
survey.

The recurrence of old-fashioned intentional racism

on campuses is the most obvious form of hostility, and a
sampling demonstrates the ferocity of some such incidents,
36 See Mangan, supra note 33, at A29, col. 2 (comment of
University of Texas student). An overtly hostile reaction to
black campus institutions is reported in Magner, supra note \33\,
at A30, col. 1 (white students at Temple University form a "White
Student Union," created "to oppose affirmative action and
encourage white pride"). On racial dynamics in the classroom,
see Crenshaw, supra note 8.
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which have variously involved: graffiti containing swastikas
and antiblack epithets; cross-burning; the protesting of an
all-white fraternity's "White History Week" party; the
shouting of racial slurs; the distribution of openly hostile
leaflets; racial brawls; and black student class boycotts
and protests.

The comprehensive list of such incidents is

much longer, and that list does not include unreported
incidents, which may well be the majority.37
37 See Academe, supra note 33, at 57 (reporting several
incidents: black academic counselor finds words "death n-gger"
scratched on office door; a wooden cross doused with fuel was
found in front of the Black Cultural Center at Purdue University;
whites shouted slurs at rally for Rev. Jesse Jackson at Northern
Illinois University; at the University of Massachusetts, 1,500
students "swirled into a white-black brawl" after the last game
of the World Series; at the University of Michigan, leaflets
appeared with the message "Get your black asses back to Africa");
Racism Flares on Campus, Time, Dec. 8, 1980, at 28 (black
students at Williams College received messages such as "stinking
black n-ggers"; Harvard University black student leader found
racist phrases written on her office calendar; letter sent to a
black student dormitory at Wesleyan University urged "wip[ing]
all g.d. n-ggers off the face of the earth"); Aitken, supra note
30, at 58 (white students at the Citadel dressed in sheets and
burned a cross a black student's room); Horwitz, Black Students
Protest GWU Party, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1987, at A15, col. 1
("white history" party thrown during black history month); Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(leaflets on Michigan campus referred to black students as
"saucer lips, porch monkeys, and jigaboos").
Black Students in Ohio Boycott Classes, Wash. Post, Apr. 12,
1988, at A 1 4 , col. 2 [hereinafter Boycott] (black Denison
University students boycott classes to protest what they
perceived as lenient treatment of white students involved in a
racial incident). Students at Penn State, Hampshire College, and
University of Massachusetts have occupied college buildings in
attempts to win redress for a variety of racial problems on their
campuses.
See 91 Protestors Arrested, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1988,
at A 4 , col. 5 (Penn State sit-in); Students to Continue Racism
Protest, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1988, at A16, col. 4 (occupation of
campus building at Hampshire College); Protesting Students To
Meet with Chancellor, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1988, at A10, col. 1
(occupation of campus building at University of Massachusetts).
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Such blatant incidents frequently meet with some form
of condemnation from college administrators,

even though

there is often disagreement on the appropriate punishment or
remedial action when (and if) the perpetrators are caught.
Such events are less problematic as an interpretive matter
because they usually have clear perpetrators and obvious
racist intent.

Whites usually accept such incidents as

racist, though they often differ from African Americans in
their assessment of the incidents' effect,
need for remedy.

importance,

and

For instance, while many blacks tend to

see racial incidents as evidence of a recurrent problem, and
as the most overt manifestation of an attitude that takes
many subtler forms, many whites tend to see such incidents
as isolated aberrations that can be dismissed as the actions
of kooks who should be ignored.

They tend to view racial

incidents on campus the way a federal judge described such
incidents on the University of Michigan campus:

"There was

no evidence to suggest that these were anything other than
isolated and purposeless acts."

Regardless of what makes a

series of events "isolated," acts such as distributing a

More comprehensive lists of such incidents can be found in
Marcus, supra note 10, at 19 & table 2; Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 2320, 2333 n.71 (1989) (collecting a variety of incidents
and examples of "hate speech"); Shenk, Young Hate, CV Mag., Feb.
1990, at 34, 36-39 (chronicling 30 days of racial incidents in a
"month in the life of campus bigotry" and reporting estimation of
Howard Erlich of the National Institute Against Prejudice &
Violence that "'up to 8 0 percent of harassed students don't
report the harassment'").
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flier declaring "'open season1 on blacks," in which it
referred to blacks as "saucer lips, porch monkeys, and
jigaboos" were not purposeless.

The clear intent was to

demean and threaten black students, creating a hostile
environment that they would want to leave, and an
understanding that they were unwelcome if they chose to
stay.38
As to forms of racism that are more frequent— the
subtle manifestations of attitudes and preconceptions shaped
by white race consciousness that materially affect
institutional practices and interpersonal relations— there
is even less recognition; there is disagreement over whether
racism exists or has any effect at all.

Black students

often report they are "reminded every day" that they don't
belong by low-key events such as whites saying "he speaks
well for a black" or expressing "shock[] when I say
something intelligent."

Many white students frequently do

not recognize the offensiveness of such reactions,

one study

reports they are much less aware than their black
counterparts of blatant, public incidents of racism that
occur on their campuses.39

Mich.

38 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854
1989) (emphasis added).

(E.D.

39 See Wilkerson, supra note 1, § 1, at 1, col. 4 and at
34, col. 1 (reporting that "[sjeveral days spent with black
students and faculty members at the University of Michigan showed
that racism is a constant in their lives and takes an enormous
psychic and emotional toll"); id. at § 1, at 34, col. 4
(reporting on a recent study by Dr. Howard Erlich "of students at
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One does not have to talk to many black college
students before hearing stories about some suspicious
official asking them to show IDs at the entrance of their
own campus buildings because he suspected they did not
belong there; of white students moving to a new seat when a
black classmate sat too close; of black students rarely
being invited to join study groups with whites; of white
fraternity members handing out invitations on a campus
sidewalk but not offering them to minority students.

The

phenomenology of black students' experience with racism on
predominantly white campuses leaves little doubt of the
existence and effect of subtle or unconscious racism,
despite institutional policies of formal equality and racial
neutrality.40

As one college administrator concluded:

the University of Maryland in Baltimore County, [where] twothirds of white students said they had not heard about certain
racial incidents on campus, while 80 percent of black students
said they had " ) .
40 See, e.g., Aitken, supra note 30, at 58 (black student
at Yale says he is regularly stopped on campus and asked for
identification, and comments "I expect it, but I don't accept
it"); Wilkerson, supra note 1, § 1, at 34, col. 1 (University of
Michigan student notes, "Sometimes [white students will] walk to
the other side of the street if they see you coming, or they
don't want to sit next to you in class"); Wright, Black History
Month: Unconscious Racism at UVa Law, Va. L. Weekly, Feb. 10,
1989, at 3, col. 3 (suggesting that whites' frequent
categorization of all blacks as affirmative action beneficiaries
along with the reluctance of many blacks to speak up in class,
results "in fairly common exclusion of blacks from white study
groups"); Magner, supra note 34, at A32, col. 1 (black students
not handed invitations to open parties); Collison, Black Students
Cite Finances as Chief Reason for Dropping Out, Oberlin Study
Finds, Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 28, 1988, at A34 (citing
Oberlin College study in which black students said "racial
prejudice and discrimination inhibit[ed] their success as
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[Black] [s]tudents are hard put to give you a specific,
overt incident [of racial prejudice].
But what they
share is their subtle experience of rejection based on
color that many professors and white staff may not be
aware that they are sending to the student.41
The complaints of minority scholars who experience
racism as they try to forge careers in a university setting
from which they have traditionally been excluded also belies
the assumption that racism has been effectively eliminated
among the enlightened elite of the academy, especially the
faculty.

A group of leading minority law professors has

argued in an "Open Letter to Our Colleagues of the Majority
Race" that "racial indifference or insensitivity,

if not

more overt racist motives, not only exists among white law
professors, but is increasing."

Most of the cosigners

students," and was one reason for dropping out).
Scholarly research confirms these anecdotal reports.
See
Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984
and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 673, 689 (1985) (reporting that
"[r]esearch on nonverbal behavior shows that white college
students often sit further away, use a less friendly voice tone,
make less eye contact and more speech errors, and terminate the
interview faster when interacting with a black rather than a
white") (citation omitted); Weitz, Attitude, Voice and Behavior:
A Repressed Affect Model of Interracial Interaction, 24 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychology 14-20 (1972) (noting that in a
study of behavior of whites interacting with blacks, " [e]xtremely
favorable verbal attitudes were coupled with subtle signs of
rejection of blacks); Word, Zanna & Cooper, Nonverbal Mediation
of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J.
Exp. Soc. Psychology 109, 111-19 (1974) (arguing that a white
person's expectations about a black person may influence the
white's actions, and in turn induce the black to behave in a way
that confirms the original false definition).
41 Collison, supra note 40, at A34, col. 4; cf. Lacayo,
Between Two Worlds, Time, Mar. 13, 1989, at 58-68 (chronicling
the subtle racial slights black professionals face in whitedominated middle-class life).
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stated that they had "experienced indignities at the hands
of their white colleagues" and that they felt a sense of
"decreasing institutional support and increasing challenges
to our legitimacy as teachers in the classroom."
Correspondingly, Professor Brooks has asserted that an
"anti-minority mindset" is present among some white law
professors that involves "a predisposition to assess
minority performance in a negative or hypercritical fashion"
and affects hiring and advancement of minority scholars, as
well as the hospitality of both the institutions and
profession in which they work.42

42 See Lacayo, supra note 41, at 66 (observing that "[a]t
some colleges, black faculty feel so isolated that they have
negotiated telephone allowances into their job contracts to help
them stay in touch with blacks teaching at other campuses around
the country"). For an argument that scholarly discourse is often
presumed to be free of racial bias but often is not, see Kennedy,
supra note 4, at 1338-39.
For the open letter from minority faculty, see Brooks, supra
note 16, at 11.
On Brooks' theory of the anti-minority mindset,
see id. at 2-3.
For a report on the perspective of minority faculty
generally, see Blum, Tenure Rates for Black Professors Found to
Lag at White Institutions in 9 Southern States, Chron. of Higher
Educ., Sept. 21, 1988, at A13, A13-14 (reporting that "[i]n
overwhelmingly large percentages, black faculty members felt that
there was insufficient minority faculty representation on faculty
search committees, in their academic departments, and at their
institutions as a whole").
Professor Delgado makes the related argument that elite
white professors have made little use of civil rights scholarship
written by minorities, members of the very groups that are the
raison d'etre for such legal doctrine.
Delgado's survey revealed
that minority scholars are rarely cited by the most prominent
white professors whose work dominates the field.
Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
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The difficulty of dealing with racism experienced by
black students that arises from a white professor's
antiminority mindset,

selective indifference, and

insensitivity is exacerbated by the tendency of university
administrators often to acknowledge more quickly racially
offensive behavior by students than by their colleagues.
Also, the distribution of power between students and faculty
compounds the problem; students fear retaliation in the form
of classroom hostility, bad grades, poor recommendations,
worse,

or

for confronting or reporting professors who make

offensive remarks.

That undoubtedly results in

underreporting of racial tensions in the classroom.43
In numerous subtle ways, professors can demonstrate on
campus and in the classroom an insensitivity that is
experienced as hostility.

In a particularly blatant

incident, a University of Michigan dean publicly stated that
although he agreed the college should pursue affirmative
action goals,

such efforts should avoid creating an

institution to which "'minorities would naturally flock in
43 See D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) (containing
analysis of unequal institutional power between students and law
faculty, and the corresponding effect on student-teacher
relationships); Bell, Black Students in White Law Schools: The
Ordeal and the Opportunity, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 539, 547 (noting
that "frequently an insensitive teacher's remarks and conduct are
borne in silent resentment"); Matsuda, supra note 37, at 2370
n.249 ("The typical university student is emotionally vulnerable
for several reasons. . . .
A negative environmental response
during this period of experience could mar for life an
individual's ability to remain open, creative, and risktaking. ") .
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much greater numbers. f"

It is hard not to see that

statement as implying minority students are undesirable.

In

addition to such remarks, minority students may also face
professors who publish papers that claim scientific proof of
the intellectual inferiority of blacks, such as Jensen's
infamous Harvard Education Review article, or a more recent
one by a City University of New York professor.
Universities face an intractable tension between preserving
at atmosphere open to all points of view and maintaining an
environment in which all students are equally unburdened by
attitudes of bias.44
Classroom episodes are usually more subtle.
situations,

In some

letting pass without comment material such as

old court cases in law school casebooks that contain racist
language and assumptions can be offensive or uncomfortable
for minority students.

And the tone need not be as blatant

44 Dean's Remark Protested, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1988, at
A18, col. 5; see D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest
for Racial Justice (1987).
Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?
39 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1 (1969) ; Mooney, Controversial Professor
Says CUNY Pressure to Quit Course Violated Academic Freedom,
Chron. of Higher Educ., Nov. 23, 1988, at All, col 1 (noting
philosophy professor Michael Levin's article in the Australian
journal Quandrant, which asserted that "'there is now quite solid
evidence . . . that the average black is significantly less
intelligent than the average white"').
See also Ex-Baseball Official Slur Protested, Wash. Post,
Apr. 7, 1988, at All, col. 3 (University of Kentucky trustee
observed in a board meeting considering the school's divestment
from South Africa that "Zimbabwe is all n-gger now"); Feinberg,
Student Loan Crackdown Defended, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1988, at
A22, col. 1 (federal education official defends remark concluding
that historically black colleges with higher-than-average student
loan default rates '"contain a high level of thieves'").
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as that found in Plessv v. Ferguson or State v. M a n n .

Black

students are less likely than whites to feel disconnected
from (or not even to notice) behavior actions in court cases
(or fiction, or historical narratives) that are clear
examples of racial bias.

In Davis v. Mississippi, the court

recounted a police roundup, without warrants,

of at least 24

black youths, and interrogation of 40 or 50 others, after a
rape victim "could give no better description of her
assailant than that he was a Negro youth."

Such action

likely resonates with what some minority students may know
first- or second-hand.

Among a group of whites, an

assumption may silently evolve that such tactics are
sensible or necessary, whereas in a black-dominated room
there would more likely be reaction to the event as
unjustified and racially biased.

Which attitude prevails in

a college classroom reveals who is dominating the agenda and
who is likely to sense alienation.45
Those racially tinged classroom dynamics can be set off
in a variety of materials and discussions.

Introducing the

race of a defendant in a rape case or of the victimized
party in an unconscionable contracts case as one who is
illiterate and on welfare can palpably play on traditional
racial mythologies of black sexuality and violence or
ignorance and irresponsibility.

In State v. S m ith, the

45 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); State v. Mann,
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
722 (1969).
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court repeatedly referred to the defendant and other
assailants as "the largest negro" and "the negroes," making
the race of those parties the exclusive marker of their
identity.

Patricia Monture, a Native Canadian scholar,

recounted a law school class in which a court opinion
described a criminal defendant as "Indian," "drunk," and
"illiterate," as if "all of that belongs in one mouthful."
But unlike the classroom discussion of rape, during which
the professor made an effort not "to inflict any harm on any
women in the class," there was no mention of alienating
power of the racial stereotype.46
At the University of Virginia,

law students in a

contracts class were concerned about the professor's
treatment of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture,
particularly the identification of the woman as "'probably
black'" when her race was nowhere mentioned in the decision.
The case involves a low-income woman who purchased items on
credit pursuant to a contract that the court ruled was
"unconscionable" and thus unenforceable by the merchant.
The white professor (and many white students) made the
plausible argument that a defendant's race could be relevant
to speculation on the motivations of a decisionmaker such as
the merchant.

Nevertheless, the assumption of race based in

large part on such facts stated in the case as the debtor's
46 Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551, 553 (Miss. 1970).
Monture, Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah, Canadian J. Women
& the Law 159, 164 (1986).
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poverty,

illiteracy,

and acceptance of welfare payments

provided black students with a strong argument that the
discussion was based on an offensive stereotype.47
The problem is the inevitability of history and
context.

Discussions of race take place amidst well known

myths of racial characteristics that traditionally labeled
blacks as ignorant,

lazy, and irresponsible.

The stereotype

is perpetuated as individuality is diminished.

There is

probably no way to approach this topic that is not charged
with racial tension.

To ignore it is not to eliminate the

problem; it is to give control of the classroom to those
with the power to dictate that this issue of no concern.
The result is one version of the hegemony of a white racial
perspective in the classroom,

and, concomitantly,

version of racial subordination.

one

A public confrontation of

the debate at least acknowledges the problematic
disagreement and allows some voice to each perspective.
Professor Brooks has made a related point.

When

"individuals or institutions having 'good' intentions engage
in a pattern or practice of granting low priority to matters
of keen importance to minorities . . . that is
subordination,
concerned."

and, hence, racism as far as minorities are

One of the central premises of this thesis is

47 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
For an account of student reaction to the
discussion of Williams. see Va. L. Weekly, Apr. 22, 1988, at 1,
col. 1.
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that the sincerity of white students and teachers is not
always the issue.

Often, whites' denial that they see

racism in a situation where blacks complain of it is
genuine.

It is simply an interpretation of a social

situation that has been formulated from a "second-hand"
knowledge of racism at best,

from the history of a group

that has never experienced racial prejudice.

It should be

uncontroversial to assert that many whites have made little
effort to understand the experience of their black
counterparts.

I do not argue that whites have an incapacity

for empathy or understanding that could lead to a congruence
of vision with people of color.

But because white as a

group, and white institutions, have not made much effort
toward such an understanding, their protestations of
innocence when blacks complain of racism receive a chilly
reception.

What students of color seek, I think, when they

complain of racism in the university is not only prevention
of similar incidents and perhaps punishment for past ones,
but also for recognition of their experience of racism,

for

their understanding of racism that arises from being on its
"receiving end."48

B.

The Effects of Racism in the University
The daily repetition of subtle racism and subordination

in the classroom and on campus can ultimately be, for
48

See Brooks, supra note 16, at 9-10.
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African Americans, more productive of stress, anxiety, and
alienation than even blatant racist acts.

One University of

Colorado student expressed a common complaint.
to class,

. . . I ’m never just a student.

black student.

"When I go

I ’m always a

If a black issue comes up, I have to

represent the black people."

The subtle,

institutional

racism and white racial perspective that pervade
predominantly white campuses should be viewed as an equal
protection problem —

an infringement of black students'

right to equal enjoyment of an education.49
When racially insensitive behavior occurs in the
classroom or elsewhere in the university, black students

(or

other minority groups) are deprived of the opportunity to
receive an education in an environment free of harassment,
hurt, and humiliation.
that,

for example,

The perpetual lack of awareness

a "White History Week Party" or a Black

Sambo caricature on a white fraternity's poster is offensive

49 Lederman, On a Campus That's Almost All White, Black
Athletes and Non-Athletes Struggle to Cope with Isolation, Chron.
of Higher Edu c . , Feb. 15, 1989, at A33, A35 (statement of black
student at the University of Colorado) ; see also The Pull of
Black Colleges, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at B 2 , col. 4
(statement of American Council on Education Official) ("'What
concerns [black] students is the day-to-day hostility.
When you
are in a dorm and the white students don't speak to you.
When
you go to class, you become invisible, and then you answer a
question and they ask, how did you know that.
It leaves the
students exhausted."); School Colors, supra note 10, at 17, col.
3 (statement of professor of Afro-American Studies) ("I feel
racism all around me. . . . But it's hard to pin down.
It's
like AIDS.
Ask most people if there's an AIDS problem, and
they'll say they don't feel it.
But people who have AIDS say
otherwise.").
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to black students is a clear indication that black
perspectives are not part of the campus culture or community
consciousness.

Black students may attend class

(and take

exams) having just confronted offensive reminders of either
overt racial hostility or subtle racial insensitivity—
perhaps in the campus newspaper, on posters at the bus stop,
the structure of classroom discussion— that serve as
distractions from academic performance that white students
do not endure.

Institutions premised on a white norm must

be continually reminded, on occasions when the white norm
manifests itself too blatantly, that their lack of awareness
is not harmless.50
Language has the power to cause injury.

Professor

Fraser has put the point this way:
Control over language is power . . . .
The ability to
create, disseminate and alter discourse is essential to
the exercise of hegemonic power.
A group can control
experience by controlling discourse and language for
through language we understand, articulate and indeed
experience experience.51
50 See Cavalier Daily, supra note 2, at 1, col. 3. An allwhite fraternity advertised a party using a poster illustrated
with a "Fiji islander" caricature (resembling Black Sambo art)
standing near a sign warning that no "short wops" and "nega
babes" would be allowed into the party.
After black students
complained, the fraternity president lamented, "It bothers us
that we have to defend ourselves against racism when we know we
are not racist."
51 See Fraser, What's Love Got to Do With It?: Critical
Legal Studies, Feminist Discourse, and the Ethic of Solidarity,
11 Harv. Women's L.J. 53 (1988) (footnote omitted); see also
Matsuda, supra note 37, at 23 35 ("From the victim's perspective,
[a variety of overt and covert means of expressing racism,
including sanitized racist comments] inflict wounds, wounds that
are neither random nor isolated.").
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Language and behavior that demonstrate an obliviousness to
minority communities stigmatize those communities and
marginalize individuals' value as community members.

As

institutional practices they marginalize black concerns and
perspectives and hinder black students' participation in
community life because they are implicitly excluded from
fully contributing to the creation of community norms,
values,

assumptions,

and perspectives.

Toleration of racial

insensitivity "den[ies] recognition to sensibilities
essential to [black students']
respect their personhood."

identities [and] fails to

Racial insensitivity diminishes

the equal standing of some community members, and thereby
diminishes the ideal of equality that is the community's
foundation.52
A notorious and much-discussed example was the incident
arising from Harvard Law Professor Derrick Bell's visiting
professorship at Stanford Law School in 1986.

After white

students complained that Bell's constitutional law course
lacked "balance" because of the attention Bell gave to

52 Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 682, 691 (1988) (noting, id. at 690, "[r]eligious
and racial affiliations are central to the identities of many
individuals.").
Racial identities lead to distinct minority experiences in
integrated universities.
See accounts of black students in Yale
Alumni Mag., May 1969, quoted in 1 The University Crisis Reader
385-86 (I. Wallerstein & P. Starr eds. 1971) (One student
suggests, "Yale can do some things for blacks? one thing Yale
c a n 't do is provide inspiration for blacks."
Id. at 386.).
For
evidence that times have not changed, see Wilkerson, supra note 1
and accompanying text.
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issues of race and slavery, the faculty organized several
11enrichment11 lectures to "supplement” Bell's teaching.

Bell

was not informed of the student complaints nor of the
purpose of the lecture series, which was canceled after
Stanford's black law student group protested.53

White

faculty took the word of their white students — rather than
their black colleague— that Bell's course was not
"balanced," meaning that it was not "neutral" according to
traditional curricular priorities practiced by white
professors.

The result was a confrontation that ended in a

humiliating experience for the Stanford faculty as well as
Bell.
The racial dynamic— arising out of occasional blatant
racism, recurrent subtle remarks or unconscious behavior,
and an ever-present hegemony of an institutionalized white
norm and racial perspective— conspires to create a
cognizable injury to black students in predominantly white
schools.

It alters students' conditions of education just

as courts have recognized racial harassment on the job
alters conditions of employment.

Racism adds to the stress

and anxiety that diminish any person's ability and desire to
excel in an academic environment, especially one leading to
a professional world known to contain further racial
roadblocks to career advancement and hospitable working

53 For a more detailed account of the incident, see Brooks,
supra note 16, at 1-2.
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conditions.

The racial dynamic to which black students are

subjected at predominantly white colleges contributes to
stress that has a detrimental effect on personal well-being
as well as academic performance.54
Such an injury is exactly the one found cognizable
under Title VII for employees who endure racial harassment
on the job; psychological well-being is statutorily
protected.

It is also in effect the same injury that the

54 Racial harassment that creates a hostile work atmosphere
has been found to alter the terms or conditions of employment in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert,
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
See Fleming, Stress and Satisfaction in College Years of
Black Students, 50 J. Negro Educ. 307, 318 (1981):
The results [of a study designed to locate some of the
sources of black students' stress and satisfaction] suggest
that students in a white urban university may divert energy
away from intellectual mastery toward filling the
interpersonal void created by the alienation and loneliness
of being black on a white college campus.
See also Fleming, Blacks in College (1984), cited in Wash. Post,
Nov. 11, 1988, at B 2 , col. 4 (study concluded black students show
more intellectual growth and do better at black colleges than at
predominantly white schools).
For a revealing personal account of the operation and
effects of racial dynamics in an academic setting, see Monture
supra note 46, at 163-66.
The self-defense or survival mechanisms that black students
develop are not, as Professor Bell has argued, "conducive to the
intensive, purposeful effort needed to succeed in law school.
These attitudes are actually detrimental, constituting the most
serious deprivation the black student faces," a handicap "growing
out of the black student's highly developed sensitivity to racist
viewpoints . . . ." Bell, supra note 43, at 548.
Low expectations of minority students from faculty and other
students can lead, for a variety of reasons, to self-fulfilling
prophecies.
See generally R. Rosenthal & L. Jacobson, Pygmalion
in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual
Development (1968) (discussing how teachers' expectations for
students affect student performance).
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United States Supreme Court found to be caused by
segregation in Brovn v* Board of Education: "a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community," which may
H,affect[] the motivation of [black students] to learn . . .
and to deprive them of some of the benefits'" they would
enjoy in an educational setting free of racial harassment
and subordination.55
Language and behavior that arises from a lack of
awareness of particular racial perspectives

(within a larger

institutional white norm that denies its own racial
nonneutrality) hinders minority students' participation and
opportunity in the university.
and occasional hostility,

in addition to the preexisting

conflict in racial viewpoints,
possibility,

The resulting racial tension

further preclude the

for all races, of race-neutral behavior.

Institutional racism requires an institutional commitment to
recognition and remedy:
Official tolerance of racist speech in [the university]
setting is more harmful than generalized tolerance in
the community-at-large.
It is harmful to student
perpetrators in that it is a lesson in getting-awaywith-it that will have lifelong repercussions.
It is
harmful to targets, who perceive the university as
taking sides through inaction, and who are left to
55 Text of Title VII is at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1981)? see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (holding Title VII
protects "employees psychological as well as economic" rights and
"the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers"); Davis, Race Harassment Discrimination: A Problem that
Won't Go Away?, 10 Empl. Relations L.J. 415, 418 (1985).
Quotation is found in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954).

their own resources in coping with the damage wrought
Finally, it is a harm to the goals of inclusion,
education, development of knowledge, and ethics that
universities exist and stand for. 6

56 Matsuda, supra note 37, at 2371; see also id. at 2339;
Delgado, supra note 44, at 137.
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IV.
A.

POSSIBILITIES FOR REMEDIAL ACTION

Strategies to Sanction Racist Speech and Behavior
The most egregious forms of racist language and

behavior— the forms closest to traditional intentional
racism— can be combated with traditional legal sanctions.
One promising route for expansion of existing options would
be legislation covering university students and mirroring
Title VII imposition of liability for contributing to
racially hostile environments.

Federal courts have

vindicated claims of a "hostile environment" caused by
racial or sexual harassment as a form of race or sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII.

The United

States Supreme Court also has imposed liability for
"toleration and tacit encouragement of racial harassment"
after finding that a labor union failed in its "affirmative
duty to combat employer discrimination in the workplace."57
57 For an excellent summary of existing legal remedies
available to combat racial harassment on campus, see Note,
Student Discriminatory Harassment, 16 J.C.U.L. 311, 314-19 (1989)
(identifying the utility of federal statutes including 18 U.S.C.
§ 245 (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)).
For Title VII hostile environment cases, see Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment); Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F .2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972) (racial harassment).
See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665-67 (1987)
(liability for union's "toleration" of and failure to combat
employer bia s ) .
Walter B. Connolly, J r . , an attorney speaking to the
National Association of University Attorneys, warned that
universities could be held liable under recent Supreme Court
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Students are,

in all relevant respects,

situation to employees.

in an identical

They are subordinates with an

economic need to remain in the institution (on the job), are
vulnerable to dismissal from superiors, and have little
\

power within the institution to react against racial
harassment from coequals or superiors.

Their only recourse

when confronted with problems is to quit, to use
institutional policies, or to seek legal remedy.
of such a remedy, however, would be limited.

The scope

For the

university to be liable for student behavior under a Title
VII model, the administration would have to be aware of, and
yet not have tried to stop or punish, racial harassment.
Another option would be sanctions for intentionally
racist insults,
and Matsuda.

such as those proposed by Professors Delgado

Professor Delgado's proposal for a tort action

imposing liability for intentional racial insults would be
as feasible a tool to fight campus-based racism as it would
be against racism

generally.

As he defines it, the cause

of action would require the plaintiff to prove that
"[ljanguage was addressed to him or her by the defendant
that was intended to demean through reference to race; that
the plaintiff understood as intended to demean through
reference to race; and that a reasonable person would

Title VII doctrine for not effectively combating racial
harassment on campus.
Fields, Colleges Advised to Develop Strong
Procedures to Deal With Incidents of Racial Harassment, Chron. of
Higher Educ., July 20, 1988, at All.
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recognize as a racial insult."

And Professor Matsuda has

recently argued for a narrow criminal statute to punish
intentionally racist speech.

Her proposal would limit guilt

to cases in which "[t]he message is of racial inferiority[,]
. . . is directed against a historically oppressed group[,].
. . [and] is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading."58
Finally, there is the option of institutional remedies
for racially offensive speech and behavior, an option with
which several universities are now struggling.

In Doe v.

University of Michigan, a federal district court struck down
the University of Michigan's policy to combat campus racial
harassment,

finding that it violated the first amendment on

vagueness and overbreadth grounds.59
The c o u r t 's reasoning suggested the constitutional
limits of any university policy, and thus the limited
utility of such a policy for addressing the varieties of
racial tension on campuses.

First, any limitation on speech

58 For Delgado's seminal study of the tort for racial
insults, see Delgado, supra note 44, at 179.
He collects a wide
array of evidence to suggest that such insults produce
psychological, sociological, and political harms that merit legal
protection, and that they are at least on par with other
cognizable inflictions of severe emotional distress.
Id. at 13549.
For Matsuda's proposal, see Matsuda, supra note 37, at 23 5658, 2370-73.
59 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-67
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
In addition to the University of Michigan policy, policies
have been debated or enacted at Stanford University, the
University of Wisconsin, and at the State University of New YorkBuff alo Law School.
Copies are on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association.
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that includes the threat of formal,

institutional sanctions

cannot be applied to speech that "disseminates ideas" or to
statements that are made in the course of classroom academic
discussions.

The Doe court cited Michigan's resolution of

complaints against students making offensive remarks in the
classroom as examples of the policy's overbreadth and
infringement on protected speech (even though the University
did not apply formal sanctions in any of the three cases
cited by the court).

Thus, a university could not formally

punish statements motivated by racism when they are
purportedly part of a serious idea or theory offered in the
university classroom or other formal forum.

(The University

of Michigan policy excluded from regulation anything
published in university-sponsored publications such as the
Michigan Daily newspaper.)

The Doe court implied, however,

that a university might be able to sanction "conduct such as
racial slurs and epithets in the classroom directed at an
individual victim."60
Second, the Doe court ruled that the Michigan policy
was too vague,

saying "it was simply impossible to discern .

. . any conceptual distinction between protected and
unprotected conduct."

The court found the policy's

requirements that sanctionable language "'stigmatize'" or
"'victimize'" an individual, and "'involve an express or
implied threat to an individual's academic efforts,'" to be
60

721 F. Supp. at 864-68.
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unconstitutionally vague.

It said that those terms "elude

precise definition," and that " [i]t is not clear what kind
of conduct would constitute a 'threat1 to an individual's
academic efforts."61
(The plaintiff in Doe was a graduate student in
"biopsychology," whose study focused on "controversial
theories positing biologically-based differences between
sexes and races [that] might be perceived as

'sexist' and

'racist' by some students, and he feared that discussion of
such theories might be sanctionable" under the university's
antidiscrimination policy.

Such offensive but academically

oriented discussion is clearly what the court was most
interested in excluding from any chilling effects of an
antidiscrimination policy.62)
Thus,

if Doe represents the interpretation of current

first amendment doctrine that universities will face in
combating racist conduct,

it is clear that even a revised,

more carefully crafted antiracism policy could not reach
more subtle forms of racism with formal sanctions,
especially in the classroom.

Universities, then, will have

to develop two-part policies. One part can address
egregious, blatant speech and conduct that is legally
sanctionable under the first amendment.

Universities have

taken a variety of actions to discipline racially offensive
61

Id. at 867.

62

Id. at 858.

58
behavior by students,

including suspensions, mandatory

community service, and mandatory attendance at racial
sensitivity seminars, that could be incorporated into such a
policy.

When dealing with student groups such as

fraternities,

a university could revoke charters or deny

privileges granted by the university,

such as permission to

use campus meeting rooms and other facilities.
In comparatively rare cases, colleges have reprimanded
such behavior by faculty as well, with public reprimands,
prohibitions on teaching certain courses, and even
suspension.

At the City University of New York,

for

example, the Faculty Senate of City College (at which 40% of
the students are black) passed a resolution "disavow[ing]
and reject[ing] the abhorrent sentiments" of a professor who
published an article asserting that "the average black is
significantly less intelligent than the average white."
Schools can also employ a variety of other sanctions against
faculty: a bar from teaching certain classes, temporary
suspensions,

a letter noting the incident placed in the

professor's permanent file, a mandatory apology, and
temporary ineligibility for research funding, sabbaticals,
or merit-based salary increases.63
63 See Mooney, supra note 44, at All; see also Raphael,
T.A.'s 'Racist' Remark Results in Firing, The Nat'l College
Newspaper, Oct. 1989, at 2 (University of Maryland teaching
assistant fired for describing student's classroom performance as
"typically black"); cf. Winfrey v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 467
F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Neb. 1979) (letter placed in file of foreman
by employer as part of sanction for racially insensitive remark
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The second part of an institutional policy would aim to
deter nonsanctionable and more subtle conduct that is
nevertheless offensive,

i.e., behavior that will never be

reached by formal adjudication but which the university
needs to recognize,

condemn, and discourage.

The

development of this second aspect of an antiracism policy
will be the more difficult to formulate.
only deliberate,

Yet, to recognize

intentional racism is to give to deny the

injurious force of subtle racism and an institutional white
norm.

The absence of such a policy signals that the

community— more specifically the dominant forces within it—
does not care about other forms of racism that continue to
permeate university life and subordinate minority interests.
Such a policy also would serve the educative function of the
criminal law; it would express a societal judgment on the
inappropriateness of some behavior, and define such behavior
as beyond collective norms.64
Universities can formulate a wide variety of responses
to nonsanctionable behavior.
committee could,

A "minority concerns"

for instance, approach a professor or

student whose conduct in the classroom had offended a
community member, make the offender aware of the offense

to an employee).
64 See generally E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in
Society 39 (W.D. Halls trans. 1984) (stating that "an act is
criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the
collective consciousness").
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while preserving the c o m p l a i n a n t s anonymity,
meet with the offender.

and ask to

It could ask for an apology or

voluntary attendance at a racial awareness seminar.

Such a

committee could also periodically and publicly report the
type of offensive incidents and behavior that minority
community members experience,

in an effort to raise

awareness and spark discussion of the type of offenses
minorities suffer on campus.

Finally, universities can

make— and in some cases have made— affirmative use of their
first amendment prerogatives, publicly and officially
condemning offensive behavior that they are otherwise unable
to sanction.65
There will no doubt be charges that drawing attention
to and institutionally responding to subtle, racially

65 The University of Michigan developed an "interpretive
guide" to supplement its antidiscrimination policy, which was
condemned by the Doe court as including constitutionally
protected behavior.
Examples from the guide included: "A male
student makes remarks in class like 'Women just aren't as good in
this field as m e n , ' thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere
for female classmates.
Students in a residence hall have a floor
party and invite everyone on their floor except one person
because they think she might be a lesbian. . . . You display a
confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence hall."
Doe. 721 F. Supp. at 857-58.
For an affirmative use a universities first amendment rights
to fight racial harassment see, e.g., Brown U. to Strengthen
Rules Against Racism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1989, at B 8 , col. 1
(describing Brown University president's response to racist
incidents on campus, which included a promise to strengthen
policies against racism, a public condemnation of "those who
would attempt to disrupt our university and poison our
community," and a letter sent to all parents of Brown students
promising to prosecute and expel students responsible for racial
harassment if caught).
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charged remarks made during the course of classroom
discussion will "chill" discussion of sensitive topics by
students and faculty.

But such a concern must be weighed in

light of the fact that the discourse of black students and
other offended groups who suffer the offense of such remarks
and endure an uncomfortable or hostile classroom and campus
atmosphere is already being chilled.

Their participation,

their points of view— including the view that certain
remarks are offensive— are marginalized, devalued, made more
difficult and less legitimate to express.

The issue is not

simply one of punishing offensive behavior versus free
expression;

it is also a question of whose expression will

be most privileged by institutional structures.
Universities make decisions about the value of speech
and ideas every day in their decisions to hire and tenure
some faculty members rather than others, to fund some
research and teaching programs rather than others.

Choosing

to fund, say, an early American history program instead of
an African American history program means that the
university considers the former to be more valuable.

But

there is no reason an institution cannot similarly express
its disdain for expression by faculty and students that is
racially offensive.
An affirmative strategy to make racist expression
unwelcome and uncomfortable could work in conjunction with
the many other educative efforts aimed at eliminating white
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cultural hegemony on campus.

A sampling of such efforts

might include: working toward curriculum diversity and the
inclusion of minority writers in "core" reading lists;
periodic programs to promote racial awareness,

including

cultural awareness seminars or public debates on racially
charged subjects for students and faculty; and permanent
campus hotlines to which students and others can report
racially offensive incidents.66
All that, however,

is likely to bring about fundamental

change in university race relations only in concert with a
more basic restructuring that empowers the black community
to define a portion of institutional life according to its
own racial norm and perspective.

That was the aim of

Vincent Harding's proposal for "The Institute of the Black
World," which was designed to respond to "our own
[predominantly black]

institutions being destroyed" and

would have been "a place where Black students and professors
who went to [elite, predominantly white universities] could
spend a year in a predominantly Black academic setting."

It

is also the central purpose of historically black colleges.

66 See Detlefsen, supra note 10 (chronicling, though
commenting negatively upon, Harvard University's "Actively
Working Against Racism and Ethnocentrism" (AWARE) w eek); Mangan,
supra note 33, at A32, col. 3 (noting that the University of
Texas plans to offer a program of multiculturalism for all
entering freshmen during orientation session); Fields, supra note
56, at A 1 2 , col. 5 (attorney specializing in equal-employment
litigation recommends "yearly training programs for
administrators, faculty members, and students to raise people's
awareness and sensitivity about racial harassment").
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The ability of a black community to achieve such an
assertion of identity depends, however, on all groups
recognizing that white-defined "neutral" perspectives are,
instead, often white-dominated racial perspective to which
there are alternatives.67

B.

An Alternative Strategy
Punitive strategies such as sanctions on speech do not

address the root of racial tensions in that they react to
racial incidents without challenging the causes.

There is

an obvious need to do more than simply punish blatant racist
behavior and mediate less blatant controversies.

If white

universities will recognize why black students feel that
white universities are not "their place," and if they can
recognize complaints about classroom dynamics and the need
for black cultural institutions on campus, universities can
go a lot further toward structuring themselves in a manner
that gives black students an educational experience
67 See Lawrence, Education for Black Power in the Eighties:
Present Day Implications of the Bakke Decision, 10 Nat'l Black
L.J. 58, 62-63 (1987).
The preservation of a distinctly black academic environment
was the aim of students at North Carolina Central University who
wrote an editorial in their campus newspaper, titled "Is NCCU
Still a Black School," opposing the "rapidly growing white
population on our campus."
The paper's editors argued, " [b]lack
students on this campus have never made it clear . . . that we
are indeed separate from [white students] . . . and "[u]ntil we
assume the role of a strong, proud people we will continue to be
co-opted."
The university administration sought to deny funding
to the newspaper in response to the editorial, and the dispute
ended up in federal court.
See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456,
458 (4th Cir. 1973).
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equivalent to that of white students.
Change based on such recognition, however,
of the equation.

is only part

The academy must also address why many

white students themselves have so little understanding of
the need for distinctly black institutions and why some
white students feel so threatened by such institutions that
they want to form "white student unions," fly Confederate
flags, or voice resentment of affirmative action plans and
black students' complaints about classrooms.
As Professor Crenshaw notes, black students requesting
more minority professors and curricula adjustments are
voicing a deeper dissatisfaction with their experience in
white institutions.

Black students do not want black

professors simply to satisfy a need for role models, though
that is important.

Black professors, along with substantive

curriculum changes and African-American social institutions,
are likely to create a classroom experience that even wellintentioned white teachers often cannot.

That is because

the cultural assumptions and lived experience that go into
forming the presuppositions and perspectives on classroom
issues are not largely matters of intention.

They are

matters of culture, of social history, of whatever the
descriptive term that characterizes the difference between
white and black experiences in America such that the races
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create divergent interpretations of the same event.68
It is up to our universities to help white students
realize that their institutions are not culturally and
racially neutral, and that minority students have an equal
right to institutional structures and practices informed by
their own experience and history.
however,

At the same time,

it will not be a sustainable arrangement to force

whites into a posture of perpetual guilt and contrition;
such a development would likely result either in a barrier
to interracial communication, because well-intentioned
whites would be overcautious in broaching any racially
tinged topic, or in further backlash by those who feel no
personal guilt.

Efforts are needed by white students and

faculty to reformulate white self-awareness toward a more
secure identity that is not threatened by black cultural
institutions and that can recognize the racial nonneutrality
of the institutions which whites dominate.
Thus, an alternative strategy for combating racial
tension on campuses would include a restructuring of the
university to give minority students as much of a feeling of
belonging, as much of a feeling that the university is
"their place," as white students usually experience.

The

68 Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1-2; see also Bell, The Price
and Pain of Racial Perspective, Stan. L. Sch. J . , May 9, 1986, at
5 (describing the unfavorable reaction of students and faculty to
Professor Derrick Bell's teaching, in which he "tr[ied] to bring
to my classrooms . . . my experience and perspective as a black
man in this country").
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strategy would include substantially increasing the number
of black faculty members so that the experience in many
classrooms is no longer premised on an unspoken norm of
white race experience.

It would likely include increasing

other minority-focused institutions on campus, such as
cultural centers and events, African-American study
programs, and perhaps even separate disciplinary procedures,
since it is a common complaint from minority students that
official

(even student-run) disciplinary systems

disproportionately and unfairly sanction minority students.
It would include,

in short, the power to define a portion of

institutional life by a black norm, a black race
consciousness, concomitant to the white norm with which
white students and teachers now (mostly unconsciously)
infuse campus and classroom experience.69

69 See, e.g., Honor Seeks More Diversity, Cavalier Daily,
Oct. 10, 1989, at 1 (reporting on Honor Committee's Minority
Concerns Team status report and efforts "to improve and establish
a more positive [minority] presence" in the honor system).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Racism must be struggled against not only through the
formal procedure of a committee for complaints

(although

establishing a committee will serve as a signal of
institutional commitment).

Universities must grapple with

racism through the recognition of the distinct groups within
the community and of their struggles for power,

including

the power to define racism and its injury— and to impose a
cultural norm that will be the premise of classroom debate
as well as social life.

Universities must also acknowledge

the relevance of race to aspects of the institution,
particularly classroom pedagogy,

in which a "norm of

perspectivelessness" now prevails that denies the relevance
of "individual values, experiences, and world views" to
classroom discussion and textual interpretation.70
Competing conceptions of what racism is and efforts to
structure institutional and social life around one or more
of those conceptions are arenas of struggle.

With a

normative commitment to empower those whose experience has
not previously informed university life, the dominant group-here, whites— can achieve a better understanding of others'
experience.

The project will require a dialogue free from

suspicion and committed to empathy— "a sentiment of
70

See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 2-3.
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community strong enough to enable each group to entrust its
fate to the good faith and decency of the other."71
Recognizing that the issues of race do not always
accuse the individual of deliberate racist intent, we can
begin to reform institutions in which the repression of
race-specific experience will be replaced by acknowledgement
and empowerment of it.
to shape,

influence,

By granting black people the power

and control university life in the same

way whites now do, black students will not have to depend
solely on the good faith and commitment of whites to enforce
antiracism policies as the primary remedy of racial tension.
By acknowledging and fostering distinct, multiple racial
perspectives instead of seeking a nonexistent neutral,

race-

free perspective as the premise of institutional life,
minority students will be able to participate in a
university that is as much theirs as it is their white
counterparts *.

71 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1345; see generally Crenshaw,
supra note 6, at 1370-76 (discussing "the Politics of
Otherness").
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